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Abstract
The present study tests the generalizability of the hidden investment hypothe-
sis (Wakabayashi, Graen, Graen, & Graen, 1988) for Japanese management sys-
tems. The hidden investment hypothesis was derived from a 13-year longitudinal 
study of the career progress of a cohort of 85 college graduates who joined a sin-
gle Japanese company in the same year, and states that the higher the quality of 
the vertical exchange relationship between a manager and supervisor, the greater 
the career progress of that manager. To test for the generalizability of the hidden 
investment hypothesis, 1,075 line managers at four different hierarchical levels 
were sampled from five of the leading corporations in Japan. Hierarchical regres-
sion and path analysis showed that both vertical exchange quality and hierarchi-
cal level contributed uniquely to investments in managers’ careers after the con-
tributions of company, age, tenure, education, technical specialty, and intrafirm 
mobility were controlled. The contributions of these control variables were esti-
mated and a summary path diagram is presented. Implications of these findings 
for our understanding of Japanese management development are discussed. 
The authors would like to thank Joan Graen, Mike Graen, Marty Graen, and M. Sano for 
their research assistance, and the Fulbright Commission, Nagoya University, and the 
University of Cincinnati for partial support on this project. 
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Introduction 
In contrast to Western management systems, Japanese systems have 
traditionally been recognized for their practice of “lifetime employment,” 
in which tenured employees are ensured that they will be able to prog-
ress in their careers within the management system of the organization 
which hires them directly out of college (Yoshino, 1968; Ouchi & John-
son, 1979; Abegglen & Stalk, 1985; Johnson, 1989). Because of this, it is of-
ten believed that promotion in a Japanese organization occurs in a “lock-
step” fashion—everyone is promoted at roughly the same point in their 
careers through the various levels in the organization, until the “cohort” 
of managers reaches the executive level. At this point, when the advance-
ment opportunities become limited, the most promising individuals are 
identified to enter the executive suite (Takagi, 1985). The remaining man-
agers of the cohort are then promoted out of the organization. Thus, ac-
cording to this model, career progress is similar for all managers in the 
organization until the cohort of managers nears the end of their careers, 
at which point the identification of those who will progress to the execu-
tive suite is determined. 
Recently, however, the validity of this model of the Japanese career 
development system has been challenged by Wakabayashi, Graen, and 
colleagues (Wakabayashi et al., 1988; Graen, Wakabayashi, Graen, & 
Graen, 1990). These authors have provided evidence that the “lock-step” 
portrayal of Japanese career progress may not be accurate. Instead, they 
suggest that managers in the Japanese system, similar to managers in 
the Western system, experience differentiation in their career progress 
throughout their careers, through a process of “hidden investment.” Ac-
cording to hidden investment, the managers who will vie for the execu-
tive suite are identified early in their careers and prepared for their en-
try to the executive suite through “hidden investments” which occur 
throughout their careers. 
Support for the hidden investment model was provided by a longi-
tudinal investigation of Japanese line managers from their entry into an 
organization through their progression into middle management (Wak-
abayashi & Graen, 1984). In this study, the hidden investment model 
was found to predict career progress of the Japanese line managers over 
the 13 years in which they were followed (Wakabayashi et al., 1988). 
Moreover, in a comparison of the hidden investment model to other 
competing models, the hidden investment model was found to be more 
predictive of career progress in Japanese management than the assess-
ment center model (Bray & Grant, 1986; Bray, Campbell, & Grant, 1974) 
and the organizational commitment model (Porter, Crampton, & Smith, 
1976).
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Despite the support for the hidden investment model in the longi-
tudinal investigation, however, it is still unclear whether the hidden in-
vestment hypothesis established in the model is generalizable to other 
leading Japanese corporations. Thus, the purpose of the present study is 
to further investigate the hidden investment model for Japanese career 
progress. The present study tests the generalizability of the hidden in-
vestment hypothesis across a sample of 1075 line managers in five lead-
ing Japanese manufacturing and service organizations. With the use of 
this sample, it is possible to determine whether the support for the hid-
den investment model which was provided by the homogeneous cohort 
investigated in the longitudinal study will also be provided by a more 
heterogeneous cross-section of Japanese line managers. 
In the following paragraphs, Japanese management development sys-
tems will be discussed in terms of both the traditional view of Japanese 
career progress and from the perspective of the hidden investment ap-
proach for career development. The test for the generalizability of the 
hidden investment hypothesis, and the implications of the findings, will 
then be presented. 
Japanese Career Progress 
According to the traditional view of the Japanese career development 
system, the Japanese career begins with the hiring of new college grad-
uates from the leading universities in Japan. These college graduates 
are recruited by the Japanese corporations, indoctrinated in a 2-3 month 
Kenshu camp, and then placed in entry level positions. They are expected 
to move up the authority hierarchies through job rotation, on-the-job ed-
ucation, and team management as a cohort until they reach the executive 
suite (Johnson, 1989). At this point, the most promising will be tested in-
tensively over a period of 3-4 years to determine who will become ex-
ecutives. Those who adequately complete this testing process stay with 
the company, and can look forward to the status, challenge, influence, 
and the material and social rewards bestowed on the most valued con-
tributors to the corporation. The others can expect a comfortable position 
for a short time, and early retirement. Since early retirement is not an at-
tractive option for most Japanese managers, however, the competition to 
reach the executive suite can be fierce. 
Hidden Investment Model
In contrast to this model, the hidden investment model developed by 
Wakabayashi and Graen (Wakabayashi et al., 1988; Graen et al., 1990) sug-
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gests that the identification and development of future Japanese execu-
tives occurs not only when the line managers reach the executive suite, 
but also throughout their careers. In a pioneering investigation spanning 
over 13 years, Wakabayashi, Graen, and colleagues (Wakabayashi, 1980; 
Wakabayashi & Graen, 1984; Wakabayashi, Minami, Hashimoto, Sano, 
Graen, & Novak, 1980; Wakabayashi et al., 1988; Graen et al., 1990) inves-
tigated for the first time the management progress of Japanese managers 
from their entry into a Japanese organization through their progression 
into middle management. In their studies, they documented career mobil-
ity among a group of 85 male college graduates with similar backgrounds 
entering a leading Japanese corporation at the same time. By following 
these young managers throughout the 13-year period, it was found that 
the best predictor of career progress in this organization is the “hidden in-
vestment” model (Wakabayashi et al., 1988; Graen et al., 1990). 
According to the hidden investment model, those managers who 
are involved in high-quality exchange relationships with their supervi-
sors early in their careers will advance more rapidly and to higher or-
ganizational levels than those managers who are not involved in these 
high-quality relationships with their supervisors. This enhanced career 
advancement occurs because the subordinates in the higher quality ex-
change relationships receive greater investments in their career devel-
opment from their supervisors than those in lower quality exchange re-
lationships. As part of this process, the managers with more promising 
promotability potential are recognized by the organization and the su-
pervisor, and these managers receive increased investment in their ca-
reers from the organization through the supervisor. Thus, through the 
high-quality relationships, the supervisors invest more of their own valu-
able resources in the careers of these selected subordinates. 
Moreover, this investment is not a formalized, “public face” process, 
but rather a more “hidden face” process which occurs between the man-
ager and the subordinate (Zalesny & Graen, 1987; Graen, 1989). Hence, 
although it appears on the surface that the managers are treated alike, 
differentiation between the selected and the non-selected managers is oc-
curring through the hidden investments. As a result of the career invest-
ment, the selected subordinates are better prepared to handle the respon-
sibilities which come with promotions into higher management ranks. 
Hidden investments may take many forms. Graen (1989) has identi-
fied the key resources which bosses may provide to their subordinates 
as investments in the career progress of the subordinates. These invest-
ment behaviors include paying attention to the subordinate, providing 
the subordinate with inside information about the organization, giving 
the subordinate influence and authority in the organization, offering the 
subordinate latitude in the performance of his/her job, providing the 
subordinate with access to departmental resources, and allowing the sub-
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ordinate to participate in critical assignments. On a larger scale, an orga-
nization which is investing in the career of an employee will do so by en-
suring that the manager’s potential for growth in the organization is fully 
utilized. Thus, company investment in a manager’s career includes en-
suring that there are a variety of career opportunities available to the em-
ployee, that the supervisor is interested in the career progress of the em-
ployee and is demonstrating investment behaviors in that subordinate, 
and that the investment is perceived as valuable and fair to the employee, 
so that the employee will continue to be committed to career growth 
within the organization (Graen, 1989; Wakabayashi & Graen, 1988). 
In addition to the investments by the organization, hidden invest-
ments may include self-investment activities by the professionals them-
selves. According to the vertical exchange model (Graen & Cashman, 
1975; Liden & Graen, 1980; Graen & Scandura, 1987), when subordi-
nates become involved in high vertical exchange relationships they take 
on added responsibilities, responsibilities which they are not required to 
perform since they are outside of their formal job description. By agree-
ing to grow out of their jobs through the acceptance of additional respon-
sibilities, the subordinates are essentially engaging in self-investment be-
haviors (Graen, 1989; Graen & Wakabayashi, 1989). These subordinates 
are becoming proactive in their career progress by working to develop 
high-quality relationships with their supervisors which will allow them 
to obtain additional resources, and thus better prepare them for advance-
ment in their careers. The self-investment activities which may be used 
by an individual to advance in his/her career include: growing out of 
one’s job by taking on added responsibilities, relationship building, tak-
ing risks, demonstrating initiative, forming insider networks, searching 
for new opportunities for self-improvement, etc. (Graen, 1989). Hence, by 
developing high-quality relationships with the supervisor through the 
use of self-investment behaviors, developing managers may gain greater 
access to organizational resources which are critical to their career devel-
opment. In terms of the hidden investment model, therefore, self-invest-
ment behaviors by individuals are also influential in career progress. 
Thus, the hidden investment hypothesis states that those managers 
who are involved in high-quality exchange relationships with their im-
mediate supervisors will advance more rapidly and to higher manage-
rial levels than those managers who are not involved in high-quality re-
lationships with their supervisors. This advanced career progress occurs 
because the developing managers are able to gain more valuable invest-
ment in their careers by the organization and through their supervisors, 
while at the same time investing more in their own careers. The career in-
vestment bestowed by the supervisors on the high-quality managers, as 
well as the self-investment behaviors of these managers, better prepares 
them for advancement into higher level management ranks. In terms of 
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the Japanese management system, the hidden investment hypothesis 
suggests that the differentiation between the “best of the best” who will 
make it to the executive suite and those who will not begins earlier in the 
career development process than previously thought. 
Hypotheses 
Based on the assumptions of the hidden investment hypothesis, sev-
eral hypotheses for the present investigation may be proposed. Before 
these hypotheses are stated, however, it is necessary to address the is-
sue of how the present study was conducted. Because of the infeasibility 
of conducting longitudinal investigations of large numbers of Japanese 
managers throughout their careers, the present study will use a cross-
sectional design. The managers to be studied are more representative of 
the Japanese salaryman than the longitudinal sample, since they include 
a larger number of managers (1075 respondents), at various managerial 
levels, from both manufacturing and service industries. Thus, the pres-
ent sample, in contrast to the previously conducted longitudinal investi-
gation of a homogeneous cohort, will allow us to test whether the hidden 
investment hypothesis will be supported in a sample which encompasses 
a large cross-section of Japanese managers, who vary in terms of age, ed-
ucation (level and type), tenure in company, mobility, organizational 
level (status), and company (manufacturing vs. service). 
Moreover, since the design is not longitudinal, it is necessary to use 
a surrogate measure of career progress. The positive relationship be-
tween career investments and career progress has already been estab-
lished in the Japanese management progress study (Wakabayashi & 
Graen, 1984; Wakabayashi et al., 1988). In terms of this relationship, the 
hidden investment hypothesis states that it is the increased investment 
which the developing managers receive from the high-quality leader-
member relationship which allows them to advance more successfully 
in their career. In other words, the predictive relationship between ver-
tical exchange and career progress is instrumented by hidden invest-
ments. Thus, since hidden investments bestowed by the company and 
by the managers themselves are said to be indicative of career prog-
ress, hidden investments in the line managers will be used to assess the 
effect of the leadership relationship on the career progress of the 1075 
Japanese line managers. 
The hypotheses which will be tested in the present study are the fol-
lowing: (1) controlling for relevant background variables, vertical ex-
change will demonstrate a positive contribution to hidden investments in 
members’ careers, and (2) controlling for relevant background variables, 
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vertical exchange will demonstrate positive contributions to investments 
in members’ careers at each hierarchical level from management trainee 
to middle manager. These hypotheses test for the generalizability of the 
hidden hypothesis to the present sample. Hidden investments will be ex-
amined in terms of company investment and self-investment. Company 
investment is a more general measure of investments, which includes 
both supervisor and organizational investments, and self-investment in-
cludes those behaviors which the managers use to invest in their own ca-
reer progress. 
Method 
Site and Sample 
Five of the leading corporations in Japan were sampled for this study. 
Three of the corporations were manufacturing firms and two were in ser-
vice industries. Within the companies, data were collected from 1,075 line 
managers at various stages in their career development: 261 management 
trainees, 417 lower-level managers, 146 lower-middle managers, and 251 
middle managers. The response rate was 78.2%. 
Design of the Study 
The present study uses a cross-sectional design to test for the gener-
alizability of the hidden investment hypothesis while controlling for the 
contribution of relevant background variables. As mentioned earlier, the 
background variables which will be examined include company, age, 
tenure, education, engineer mobility, and status. Thus, to control for the 
background variables, all hypotheses will be tested after the contribu-
tions of these variables have been extracted. 
Measures 
Predictor Measures. To measure the quality of the relationship between 
the line managers and their supervisors, the vertical exchange scale will 
be used (Wakabayashi et al., 1988). This measure, developed by Graen 
and colleagues (Dansereau, Graen, & Haga, 1975; Graen, 1976; Wak-
abayashi et al., 1980; Wakabayashi & Graen, 1984; Graen et al., 1990), 
measures the quality of the leadership relationship by assessing the effec-
tiveness of the working relationship, and the dependability, helpfulness, 
and trust attributed to this relationship. Moreover, vertical exchange was 
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found to be predictive of career development outcomes in the 13-year fol-
low-up investigation of the Japanese Management Progress Study. In the 
present study, the 14-item vertical exchange instrument was employed 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .89). 
In addition to the vertical exchange scale, a set of background factors 
which may influence the hidden investment process were identified and 
measured. These background factors will be examined in the analyses to 
determine their effect on the hypothesized relationships. The background 
variables include: (1) company (manufacturing vs. others), (2) age, (3) 
tenure (years of service in the company), (4) education (seven ranks from 
compulsory to graduate levels), (5) engineer (engineering degree vs. oth-
ers), (6) mobility (frequency of intrafirm job change), and (7) status (four 
ranks from managerial trainee to section manager). 
Criterion Measures. To test the hidden investment hypotheses, two 
measures of hidden investment were assessed: (1) company invest-
ment, and (2) self-investment. Company investment consists of ten 5-
point items, including company’s utilization of a manager’s potential for 
growth, fairness of the investment, value of the investment, variety of ca-
reer opportunities, career relevance of the investment, supervisor’s inter-
est in a manager’s career progress, and overall assessment of the compa-
ny’s career investment. The Cronbach’s alpha for this measure was .82. 
Self-investment consists of 19 5-point items. These items asked how fre-
quently the manager engaged in role-making activities such as work-
ing to get one’s immediate supervisor promoted and to improve one’s 
leadership relationship with the supervisor, actively seeking out new op-
portunities for self-improvement, striving to add value to assignments, 
demonstrating initiative, taking risks, doing extra work, and generally at-
tempting to make one’s supervisor’s unit more effective by growing out 
of one’s present job. The Cronbach’s alpha for this measure is .92. 
Analysis 
To test the hypotheses, several analytical techniques were employed. 
First, a correlational analysis was conducted to examine the relationships 
between the background variables and the vertical exchange measure. 
Second, a special regression analysis was needed to examine the inde-
pendent contribution of the quality of vertical exchange to hidden invest-
ments. For this purpose, the contributions of background variables were 
partialled out and the unique effect of vertical exchange was calculated 
by using a method of hierarchical regression analyses (Cohen & Cohen, 
1975; Katerberg & Hom, 1981; Wakabayashi & Graen, 1984; Wakabayashi 
et al., 1988). The seven background variables entered the regression equa-
tion first as a set, and a squared multiple correlation coefficient (R21) was 
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computed. Next the vertical exchange scale was introduced and R22 was 
computed. The unique vertical exchange effect was identified in terms 
of a difference between the two R2s. The results of the regression anal-
yses for the vertical exchange measure were then examined in terms of 
the two dependent variables to determine whether they were consistent 
across hierarchical levels, i.e., status levels. Finally, path analyses were 
run to clarify empirical relationships (Land, 1969). 
Results 
The results of the correlational analysis are presented in Table I. The 
correlations between vertical exchange and the background variables 
indicate that vertical exchange is not highly correlated with the back-
ground variables. In addition, examination of the correlations between 
the background variables with each other provides some insight into the 
characteristics of the sample. Specifically, it appears that: (1) significant 
differences between manufacturing and nonmanufacturing companies 
existed on all background variables, (2) higher degree holders tend to be 
younger, with less tenure and with an engineering background, and (3) 
higher level managers tend to be older, with more tenure and more in-
trafirm mobility. 
Table II shows the results of the hierarchical regression analyses. In 
the first step of the regression analyses, the background variables are en-
tered without vertical exchange. The results of this analysis are mixed: 
(1) company contributes negatively to the dependent variables, indicat-
ing that managers in manufacturing companies are at a disadvantage in 
their career investment activities compared to those in service companies, 
particularly in terms of company investment, (2) education and mobility 
appeared to contribute positively to the self-investment activities of the 
Table I. Correlation Coefficients among Background Measures and Vertical Ex-
change for Japanese Managers
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Company  —
2. Age  –.32  —
3. Tenure  –.42 .89  —
4. Education  .32  –.42  –.60  —
5. Engineer  .31  –.31  –.41  .63  —
6. Mobility  –.11  .30  .30  –.07  .27   —
7. Status  –.21  .56  .46  .01  –.11  .27  —
8. Vertical exchange  –.04  .14  .07  .08  .02  –.01  .20 
Correlation ≥ .06 ; p ≤ .025 ; N = 1075. 
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managers, and (3) status contributed most strongly and in a positive di-
rection to both company and self-investment. In the next step, vertical ex-
change was entered into the regression equations. As expected, the effect 
of vertical exchange was positive and significant for both of the depen-
dent variables. 
To test the first hypothesis, the unique contributions of vertical ex-
change to the dependent variables were calculated. The results of this 
analysis are shown in Table II as the differential coefficient of determi-
nation (d = R21 – R
2
2 ). As the table shows, vertical exchange contributed 
significantly to career investment activities, independent of the effects of 
the background variables (d = .261, p < .01 for company investment; d = 
.176, p < .01 for self-investment). Thus, the unique portion of variance ex-
plained by vertical exchange (figures under d) is 26.1 % for company in-
vestment and 17.6% for self-investment. These findings indicate that, as 
hypothesized, managers with a higher quality vertical exchange relation-
Figure 1. Investment by company. 
Wak a bay a s h i,  Gr ae n, & Uh l-bi en i n Hum a n Rel a ti o ns  43 (1990)1110
ship with supervisors experience more company and self-investment ac-
tivities than their lower vertical exchange colleagues. 
To test the second hypothesis, the specific patterns of effects of verti-
cal exchange across hierarchical level (status) were examined. These rela-
tionships are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. In Figure 1, vertical exchange 
(high, low) and status (levels 1-4) were examined for their effect on com-
pany investment. As the figure shows, high vertical exchange managers 
received higher amounts of company investment than lower vertical ex-
change managers across each hierarchical level. Similarly, in Figure 2, 
high vertical exchange managers were consistently higher on self-invest-
ment behaviors, across hierarchical levels, than their lower vertical ex-
change colleagues. Thus, as hypothesized, the positive contributions of 
vertical exchange were consistent at each hierarchical level from manage-
ment trainee to middle manager. 
Finally, to clarify the empirical relationships found in the regression 
analysis, a path analysis was performed. To conduct this path analysis, it 
was necessary to determine the paths by which the background variables 
Figure 2. Discretional role development. 
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may indirectly influence the career-relevant outcomes. Upon closer ex-
amination of the regression results, it appeared that two paths were most 
likely: one through vertical exchange and another through status. Both 
of these variables make strong and positive contributions to the depen-
dent variables, in contrast to the other predictor variables which provide 
mixed results. However, since both variables are quite different from each 
other, it could be expected that they will provide different paths through 
which the background variables may influence investment activities. The 
path through vertical exchange could be expected to be influenced less by 
background variables, since vertical exchange is a process that emerges 
on the job based on teamwork between two personalities. In contrast, the 
path through status would be expected to be influenced more by back-
ground variables because of the institution of seniority-based promotion 
in Japanese organizations. A “pure” seniority-based management prog-
ress system would permit incremental career development opportunities 
only with promotions to higher status positions. In other words, in the 
second career path, the career opportunities would be closely calibrated 
to the status of each position in the hierarchy. 
Thus, the two paths, one through vertical exchange and the other 
through status, were subjected to a path analysis using a hierarchical pro-
Figure 3. Summary results of path analysis (ED = education, ENG = engineer, 
and VE = vertical exchange). 
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cedure (Land, 1969). Summary results of this analysis are presented in 
Figure 3. As shown in this path diagram, positive and significant paths 
(p < .05) are indicated by solid lines, and negative and significant paths 
(p < .05) are indicated by dotted lines. The model analyzed was company, 
age, education, and engineering contributing to tenure and mobility con-
tributing to status and vertical exchange contributing to company invest-
ment and self-investment. 
Results presented in Figure 3 clearly show that status received pos-
itive contributions from age, education, tenure, and mobility, and neg-
ative contributions from company (manufacturing) and engineer (engi-
neering background). This constitutes one path to company investment 
and self-investment. Following this path, age and education contribute to 
status in the management hierarchy, which in turn contributes to oppor-
tunities for company investment and self-investment activities. A second 
and much stronger path to company and self-investment is through the 
vertical exchange relationship with the supervisor. As Figure 3 indicates, 
quality of vertical exchange is a positive but weak function of the educa-
tional level, age, and status, and a negative and weak function of mobil-
ity and engineering. Following this path, age, education, and status level 
contribute to the quality of vertical exchange, which in turn contributes 
to company and self-investment activities. 
In summary, as expected, one clear path to managerial career progress 
in Japanese organizations is through education and seniority (age and/
or tenure). Another clear path runs through vertical exchange with one’s 
supervisor. To get on this path, no single important background factors 
were identified, but almost all of them were found to have some influ-
ence, either directly or indirectly. As a final note, Figure 3 indicates that 
the two criterion variables correlate moderately highly (r = .44). Thus, it is 
possible that self-investment activities may lead to company investment, 
and company investment may lead to self-investment. 
Discussion 
As predicted, vertical exchange was found to contribute positively to 
hidden investment activities. Moreover, the positive contribution of ver-
tical exchange to career investment was consistent across hierarchical lev-
els. These findings provide support for the generalizability of the hidden 
investment hypothesis across Japanese corporations. The findings also 
provide clarification of the effect of vertical exchange upon a manager’s 
career progress which was found in the preceding 13-year investigation 
(Wakabayashi et al., 1988). Specifically, the positive effect of vertical ex-
change on career progress which was found in the Japanese Management 
Progress study appears to be operating through its influence on the ca-
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reer investment activities which the high vertical exchange managers re-
ceive. This indicates that vertical exchange influences career progress by 
allowing the high vertical exchange managers to receive greater amounts 
of career investment activities than the lower vertical exchange manag-
ers, and thus to become better prepared for advancement into higher hi-
erarchical levels in the organization. 
In addition to the support for the hypotheses concerning the gener-
alizability of the hidden investment hypothesis across Japanese corpora-
tions, the present investigation also made a significant finding concern-
ing the career paths through which Japanese managers may progress. As 
the results of the path analysis indicate, two separate paths may be taken 
to achieve career progress in Japanese organizations. One path appears to 
be the traditional seniority system which is based on age/tenure and ed-
ucation and leads through promotions to career investments. The other is 
based on the quality of the vertical exchange relationship between man-
agers and their supervisors, and is influenced more by the characteris-
tics of the leader-member relationship than the background variables of 
the manager. Documentation for the existence of the “hidden face” path 
which occurs through the vertical exchange relationship provides a sig-
nificant contribution to the literature in this area, since traditional views 
of the Japanese management system have been strongly supportive of the 
seniority system (Yoshino, 1968), without considering the possibility that 
alternative career paths exist. The present findings suggest that perhaps 
the view of slow and steady “lock-step” movement up the ladder by the 
Japanese based on age and seniority is a cultural stereotype, rather than 
an accurate description of career progress. 
The findings of the “hidden face” path are also interesting because of 
their implications concerning the operations of a “fast track” and a “slow 
track” in leading Japanese corporations. In particular, it appears that the 
seniority path is employed mainly to “save face” for the slower develop-
ing managers and the hidden face path is used to stimulate the growth 
and development of the future executives. The relative contributions of 
status and vertical exchange to company investment (.18 and .53, respec-
tively) and self-investment (.22 and .43, respectively) are taken as support 
for this speculation. Once again, these findings provide support for the 
differentiated rather than the lock-step process by which Japanese career 
progress occurs. 
Thus, the present study suggests that more opportunities for invest-
ment were provided to those managers operating under high-quality ver-
tical exchanges. These opportunities make it possible for managers with 
higher quality vertical exchanges to become more involved in self-invest-
ment behaviors in their career progress because of the greater trust and 
support they receive from both their supervisors and the company. This 
finding has important implications for career progress among Japanese 
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managers. Apparently, it is these self-investment activities, in addition to 
company investment, education, and tenure, that actually contributed to 
career progress of Japanese managers. Moreover, allowing individual ef-
forts directed toward career enhancement on the job makes upward tour-
nament mobility in Japanese organizations very competitive, in contrast 
to the more steady lock-step system traditionally described. 
Conclusion 
The hidden investment hypothesis derived from the 13-year longi-
tudinal investigation of Japanese management progress was supported 
in this study of 1075 line managers in five leading Japanese corpora-
tions. The findings of strong significant contributions of the quality of the 
working relationship between a manager and his immediate supervisor 
to individualized career investments and company investment activities 
support the generalizability of this hypothesis. Moreover, these overall 
findings were replicated within each of the five companies and in each of 
the four levels of management progression. Clearly, the path to the exec-
utive suite is enhanced by hidden investment in people’s careers by their 
superiors and themselves at each rank. Finally, we suggest that those 
who seek the key differences between the leading Japanese and the lead-
ing Western management development processes consider how the con-
tributions of hidden investments are harnessed for effective teamwork in 
each system. For the implications of this for Western leadership develop-
ment, see Graen (1989). 
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